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PERFORMANCE RELATED PAY: WHAT MAKES A SUCCESSFUL 
SCHEME? 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The complexities surrounding the issue of reward management can be seen as 
indicative of the contradictions that exist within the discipline labelled human 
resource management (HRM).  For example, Storey’s (1992: 27) distinction between 
`hard’ and `soft’ HRM identifies the need for `strategic interventions designed to elicit 
commitment and to develop resourceful humans’ (`soft’ HRM) and `strategic 
interventions  designed to achieve full utilisation of labour resources’  (`hard’ HRM).  
The current state of knowledge on reward systems suggests that these are often  
designed to attempt both strategic interventions together; how successful they are on 
either count is perhaps less well documented.  This tension within HRM has been 
noted by several writers and the processes currently used to reward individuals have 
been well scrutinised (Smith, 1992; Legge, 1995; Kessler, 1995).  In the final 
analysis, it appears that many of the reward initiatives pursued represent no more 
than a `shuffling of the pack’  (Kessler, 1995:274), rather than any innovative, 
integrated strategy which could be considered part of a distinctive HRM approach.      
  
This paper considers one aspect of the current debate on reward systems by 
examining the operation of a PRP scheme in a multi-divisional company in Ireland.  
Before considering the findings of the research, the paper first of all considers some 
of the evidence available on the operation of PRP systems and describes the 
background to the study and the methodology used in the research.    
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PRP:  THE LITERATURE EVIDENCE 
The traditional personnel textbooks are noted for their prescriptive approach to most 
matters with issues neatly labelled and packaged for consumption by students and 
practitioners of personnel or even human resource management.  PRP is no 
exception to this rule with the advantages and disadvantages of such schemes 
neatly displayed, guidelines for their introduction and operation clearly laid out and 
solutions to envisaged problems helpfully provided (Armstrong, 1991; Armstrong and 
Murlis, 1994).  More recent textbooks and the evidence provided by empirical 
research (Mabey and Salaman, 1995; Geary 1992) tend to present a less optimistic 
picture of the viability of the off-the shelf schemes promoted by the textbooks and 
suggest that successful performance management schemes, of which PRP may be 
one dimension, may need to be organization specific.  However, both the textbook 
writers and the empirical researchers are agreed that a large number of issues 
surround the operation of PRP schemes.    
 
PRP as a Motivator 
The primary argument in favour of PRP is that it acts as a motivator, through both 
providing incentives in the form of monetary rewards and  by  recognising 
achievements.  Further benefits cited  include  the fact that individuals can  identify 
closely with their employers’ goals and that this can  increase productivity and 
encourage quality, flexibility and teamwork (Armstrong and Murlis, 1991; Wright, 
1991).  In addition, PRP can contribute to the successful recruitment and retention of 
staff.  However, many researchers (Dwyer, 1994; Kessler, 1992; Marsden and 
Richardson, 1992) have questioned the extent to which PRP actually acts as a 
motivator, or, indeed, the extent to which money itself can motivate:  `Most managers 
are aware of Herzberg’s view that the job itself is the source of true motivation, not 
the pay or even the conditions of work’ (Dwyer, 1994: 17).  A study by Kovach (1987) 
reported a mismatch between managerial and employee views concerning what 
motivates.  While managers attributed high financial needs to employees, staff cited 
pay as fifth on a list of ten factors, while the first four were concerned with intrinsic 
motivators.   
 
Reasons for the Introduction of PRP 
There are a variety of reasons for the  introduction of PRP schemes.  Several writers 
(Kessler, 1992; Armstrong and Murlis, 1994; Procter et al., 1993) note that a pay 
system can be used as a vehicle for organizational change.  However, PRP may 
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simply be one of a number of initiatives designed to achieve cultural change.  Procter 
et al. (1993:73) suggest that `the necessary culture may already have to be in place 
for a system of PRP to work effectively’, as PRP alone may be incapable of 
becoming the primary driving force of cultural change.   PRP may also serve the 
purpose of providing a statement to employees regarding what Kessler and Purcell 
(1992:21) describe as the `kind of company we are’ and  may reinforce existing 
organizational values and expectations.  The strategy of culture change may also 
encompass broader objectives which aim to change the relationship between 
management and employees.  Thus, it has been suggested (Ribbens, 1988; Kessler 
and Purcell, 1992; Procter et al., 1993) that the individualistic nature of PRP can be 
used to side-step the collective bargaining process, thereby reducing the influence of 
the trade union in an effort to re-establish managerial control.   
 
The Success of PRP Schemes 
The objectives in introducing PRP can  have a significant impact on the success, or 
otherwise, of the scheme and Crowe (1992:124) suggest that `each scheme will 
need to be assessed in the light of each organization’s objectives.’  Furthermore, the 
manner in which a scheme is formulated and implemented, and the extent of 
employee participation in this process, will also have an impact on the scheme’s 
success.  Case study research (Lawler and Hackman,1969; Schefflen et al., 1971) 
suggests that plans will be more conducive to both acceptance and success if 
employees are involved in their formulation.   
 
The success of a PRP scheme does not lie solely with employee involvement in the 
initial stages, or indeed even with a particular set of procedures designed to 
administer such schemes.  According to Beer et al. (1984:124), `the motivational and 
satisfactional value of a reward system is a function of the perceived equity of the 
reward system’.  Without the presence of this perceived fairness, trust in the system 
is likely to be low and there is the distinct risk that the contingent link between 
performance and pay will not be accepted.  For example, it has been noted that 
managers are often unhappy with their wage system because they do not perceive 
the relationship between how hard they work (productivity) and how much they earn 
(Hammer, 1975:17).  The issues of fairness is even more critical in flatter 
organizations where opportunities for promotion may be limited. 
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Several antidotes for this problem of `perceived unfairness’ have been suggested.  
These include the extent to which employees have the opportunity to participate in 
pay design decisions, the quality and timeliness of information provided, the degree 
to which the rules governing pay allocations are consistently followed, the availability 
of channels for appeals, and the organization’s safeguards against bias and 
inconsistency  (Greenberg, 1986). Hammer (1975:20) points out that the `more 
frequent the formal and informal reviews of performance and the more the individual 
is told about the reasons for an increase, the greater his preference for a merit 
increase system and the lower his preference for a seniority system.’  Frequent 
reviews, coupled with the opportunity to air grievances through a formal appeals 
process, may therefore eliminate many of the difficulties associated with employees’ 
perceptions of unfairness.   
 
In addition to the issue of fairness, problems associated with PRP include a tendency 
toward a short-term focus on quantifiable goals to the neglect of more long-term 
issues.  There may also be measurement difficulties, in terms of both difficulty in 
measuring the work of professionals and attaining a fair and consistent means of 
assessing employees which will avoid the risks of subjectivity (Murphy and 
Cleveland, 1995; Kessler, 1994; Beer et al., 1984).  Philpott and Sheppard (1992) 
identify a lack of communication as the principal failing and a lack of agreement on 
objectives and standards of performance and insufficient feedback may create 
further difficulties (Armstrong, 1993; Mabey and Salaman, 1995).  Storey and Sisson 
(1993) argue that PRP would appear to undermine utterly the whole concept of 
teamwork.  From research in multinationals operating in Ireland, Geary (1992) found 
evidence of the contradictory nature of management’s strategy which attempted to 
develop simultaneously a collective identity focused around teamwork, while 
discriminating between individual contributions. 
 
In summary, the available research does not suggest that PRP has been particularly 
successful as a reward strategy and there seem to be many pitfalls associated with 
its operation.  There has been little research carried out in Ireland on this topic and it 
is therefore difficult to estimate the success or otherwise of PRP schemes in the Irish 
context.  However, from the limited evidence available, it does appear  that PRP is 
an issue for Irish organizations (Gunnigle et al., 1994; Geary, 1992) and that it is 
used  in a considerable number of  firms.  The findings of the Price Waterhouse 
Cranfield survey (Filella and Hegewisch, 1994) indicate a take-up of merit or  
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performance related pay for managerial staff in 51 per cent of organizations, with 
private sector companies more likely than their public sector counterparts to employ 
this type of pay system.  PRP was less likely to be used for other types of staff with 
44 per cent of organizations using it for professional/technical staff, 27 per cent for 
clerical and 12 per cent for manual employees.   
 
THE RESEARCH 
The research utilised a combination of both quantitative and qualitative techniques in 
the collection of data.  The research took place in a multi-divisional company 
operating in Ireland.  The HR Director responsible for introducing and administering 
the scheme was interviewed and documentation relating to the operation of the 
scheme was collected.  A postal questionnaire was then sent to the 107 managers 
involved in the scheme and 70 replied, a 65 per cent response rate.  Following 
analysis of the data  using the SPSS package, interviews were conducted with  a 
cross-section of managers, with the administrators of schemes in two other firms and  
with a trade union official in order to explore in more detail issues which had 
emerged from the questionnaire findings.  This paper deals in particular with the 
views of the managers involved in the scheme. 
 
PRP IN PRACTICE 
The Acceptability of PRP 
The first issue addressed was the acceptability of the principle of PRP among 
managerial staff.  This was assessed from responses to the statement:  ‘The 
principle of relating pay to performance is essentially a good one’.  As table 1 shows, 
a total of 97 per cent of respondents agreed with the statement, suggesting a 
widespread acceptance of the fundamental concept of PRP.  However, when asked 
if they perceived the system as fair, a slightly different response was observed, with 
a total of 74 per cent replying in favour, while 25 per cent disagreed. 
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Table 1: The Concept of PRP 
 
Statement Strongly Agree Agree No View Disagree 
 % % % % 
The principle of relating pay to 
performance is essentially a good one. 
 
31 
 
66 
 
3 
 
0 
     
PRP is a good idea for managerial staff. 16 72 9 3 
     
     
The idea of PRP is fundalmentally unfair. 4 8 58 30 
     
N = 70 
 
Pay as a Motivator 
When respondents were asked for their views on the statement: ‘the most important 
thing about a job is pay’, 30 per cent agreed while 61 per cent disagreed (see table 2 
).  In contrast, 86 per cent agreed with the statement: ‘the kind of work I like is one 
that pays top salary for top performance’, indicating the relevance of highly paid work 
to the respondents, though it may not have featured as the primary motivation for the 
job.  The data also indicated that those who liked the kind of job that pays top salary 
for top performance also believed that PRP had encouraged them to give sustained 
high performance at work (r = .34, p = .005).  Differences in these views could not be 
explained by age, gender, length of service  or trade union membership.   
 
Table 2: Pay as a Motivator 
 
Statement Strongly 
Agree 
Agree No View Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
 % % % % % 
The most important thing about a job is 
pay 
 
3 
 
21 
 
15 
 
49 
 
12 
      
The kind of work I like is the one that pays 
top salary for top performance 
 
36 
 
51 
 
9 
 
3 
 
1 
      
N = 70 
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Objectives 
Table 2.3 displays the managers’ views on the reasons behind the introduction of the 
scheme. 
 
Table 3: First Ranked Objectives of the Scheme 
 
Objectives     % 
Improve performance of the organisation  57 
 
To reward good performance   15 
 
To motivate employees     9 
 
Increase commitment to the organisation   4 
 
Improve recruitment and retention of staff   9 
 
Reinforce existing culture, values, and performance 
expectations      2 
 
To promote organisational change    2 
 
To remove the bargaining process away from trade  
unions       2 
 
N = 70 
 
Just over half the managers perceived that  major objective in introducing  the PRP 
scheme was to improve the performance of the organisation.  Other objectives were 
given less importance and issues such as the promotion of organisational change 
and the reduction in trade union influence, although well documented in the literature 
as objectives of PRP were not perceived as of major importance in this study. 
 
Success of the Scheme 
Table 4 uses two statements which are designed to determine the success of the 
scheme as perceived by the managers:  ‘PRP has been successful in achieving an 
overall increase in company performance’ and ‘PRP has provided the company with 
a useful tool in increasing productivity’.   
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Table 4: Success of PRP 
 
Statement 1: PRP has been successful in achieving an overall increase in company 
performance. 
Statement 2: PRP has provided the company with a useful tool in increasing 
productivity. 
 
                                                       Statement 1         Statement 2 
 
Strongly disagree                                    2                          1 
Disagree                                                19                          9 
No View                                                 24                        23 
Agree                                                     49                        56 
Strongly agree                                         6                        11                                      
N = 70 
 
As table 4 shows, over half  the respondents agreed with statement 1, while two 
thirds agreed with statement 2.  However, 24 per cent had no view on statement one 
and 23 per cent had no view on statement two, giving the impression that a 
substantial proportion remain unaware of the success or otherwise of PRP. 
 
However, there were a number of measures commented on by the managers which 
were considered to be directly linked to the introduction of PRP and provided a more 
useful tool for assessing PRP’s success: 
 
 I would quantify that success through the ISO 9000 scheme.  Our reviews 
would indicate that management procedures are correct, quality scheme 
reviews ratings are being improved.  Our customers...are now involved in the 
ISO 9000 and they are rating us and sending our ratings back to the ISO 
9000, so customer ratings are improving as well (Manager, 1996). 
 
 Sales and marketing are very conscious of the targets being set, the key part 
of the equation.  Definitely improvement everywhere, working capital keeping 
it at most optimum level, marked improvement (Manager, 1996). 
 
An improvement in overall performance, both individual and company, was stated as 
one of the priority objectives of the scheme.  In support of this, a total of 75 per cent 
of managers agreed with the statement ‘PRP has contributed to a general 
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improvement in performance’.  Although this securely indicates a measure of 
success, it is difficult to quantify this success, as the statement is rather a general 
one; it does not specify the context of success, or indeed, how it is measured.  The 
question is whether this improvement in performance was a direct result of the 
monetary incentive, or whether PRP brings additional benefits which creates the 
motivational force for improving performance. 
 
PRP’s Effect on Performance 
The data indicated a correlation between an improvement in performance and 
improved communication with the individual supervisor.  It would appear that PRP 
provided greater opportunity to interact on a more frequent basis with the supervisor 
for the purpose of discussing the focus of direction of the targets set.  In addition, the 
statement ‘PRP makes me focus on what I’m meant to achieve’ also correlated with 
an improvement in performance, and this consistently emerged as an important 
feature of the PRP system.  For example, one half of the managers in the follow-up 
interviews mentioned that PRP had helped them to focus on certain objectives. 
 
Drawbacks with the Scheme 
The managers were asked to rank a range of drawbacks with the PRP scheme 
according to importance, and these are shown in Table 5.  A total of 42 per cent of 
managers ranked the measurement of performance as the greatest difficulty with the 
PRP scheme.  The second greatest drawback with the scheme involved a short-term 
focus on objectives, to the neglect of longer-term issues.  The third greatest 
drawback with the scheme involved a lack of reward.  The other drawbacks listed 
received relatively little attention among the managers.   
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Table 5: First Ranked Drawbacks with the scheme 
 
Statement       % 
It is difficult to measure individual performance objectively  42 
 
PRP encourages employees to exercise a narrow focus 
on short-term quantifiable goals, neglecting long-term issues  21 
 
The amount of pay involved is not enough to substantiate a 
change in performance      12 
 
It assumes that money is the best reward      9 
 
It is not successful in improving employee motivation     8 
 
PRP negatively affects teamwork, & co-operation can suffer    6 
 
It is principally unfair in discriminating between individual  
contributions         2  
N = 70 
 
Measuring Performance 
When responding to the statement ‘my work objectives are clear and specific.  I 
know exactly what my job is’, 87 per cent of managers considered that their set 
objectives were ‘clear and specific’.  Nevertheless, 78 per cent still ranked 
‘measurement of performance’ as one of the top three disadvantages with the 
system, indicating that clear and specific objectives do not necessarily result in an 
adequate measure of performance.  In both the comments on the questionnaires 
and in the follow-up interviews, measurement of performance emerged as the 
primary cause of concern and dissatisfaction with the PRP scheme: 
 
 I think that personalities will always play a big role in any individual’s 
assessment and until somebody devises a method to overcome this then I 
think we will have to live with under-performance and over-performance but I 
think that it is where a potentially very good system will become unstuck 
(Manager, 1996). 
 
Many managers expressed concern about the extent to which the maximum reward 
was achievable.  Additional difficulties with the measurement of performance were 
also evident in the comments which reflected the problems involved in defining and 
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measuring goals for managerial positions: ‘True goals are hard to clarify and harder 
still to judge’ (Manager, 1996). 
 
The task of measuring managerial performance is a difficult one.  However, a 
number of mechanisms have been suggested as means to overcoming this obstacle.  
The study revealed a heightened awareness of the importance of feedback in the 
PRP process.  However, less than half agreed with the statement ‘I receive a 
considerable amount of feedback concerning my quantity of output on the job’.  
Although a correlation existed between an improvement in communication with the 
managers’ immediate supervisor and an improvement in performance, only 27 per 
cent actually felt there was an improvement in communication between themselves 
and their immediate supervisor.  Therefore, it would appear that the extent of 
feedback available was limited for many.    
 
Short-term Objectives 
The literature highlights an over-emphasis on short-term objectives as a common 
difficulty with PRP schemes, and this difficulty was found in the case company, with 
an over-emphasis on short-term objectives ranked as second on the list of 
drawbacks with the current scheme.  A total of 51 per cent of managers agreed with 
the statement that ‘there is an over-emphasis on short-term work objectives’, while 
only 33 per cent disagreed: 
 
 Short-term goals can result in long-term neglect and the attitude of let next 
year look after itself starts to creep in (Manager, 1996). 
 
Feedback 
Some managers indicated that targets may become irrelevant as a result of 
circumstances beyond the manager’s direct control.  As one respondent commented: 
 
 It does not take into consideration the unexpected which necessitates an 
extremely high level of work on targets outside those set which might leave 
you in a position of not having achieved the set targets while having worked 
extremely hard (Manager, 1996). 
 
This comment summed up the feeling of many respondents on this issue and 
appeared to be the cause of genuine frustration among the managers.  This may be 
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linked to the extent of feedback available to managers.  Thus, when asked for their 
opinions on the statement ‘I am provided with a great deal of feedback and guidance 
on the quality of my work’, only 30 per cent agreed.  
 
Links Between Performance and Pay 
Table 6 shows  mixed opinions as to whether or not the production of high quality 
work would actually result in more pay and whether the PRP scheme genuinely 
affected work performance.  Just under half, 47 per cent, of the respondents agreed 
that producing high quality work will improve payment, while 40 per cent disagreed 
with the statement concerning PRP’s affect on their work performance. 
 
Table 6: Links Between Performance and Pay 
 
Statement Strongly 
Agree 
Agree No View Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
 % % % % % 
Producing high quality work is 
rewarded with more pay 
1 46 20 24 9 
      
PRP has no effect on my work 
performance 
11 32 17 39 1 
      
The most important thing about a 
job is pay 
3 21 15 49 12 
N = 70 
 
Teamwork 
Among managers, there appeared to be mixed views on the benefits of PRP in 
relation to teamwork.  Just under half (48.5 per cent) agreed that PRP contributed to 
more effective teamwork, while 31 per cent were in disagreement.  Furthermore, 48 
per cent of respondents ranked the statement ‘PRP negatively affects teamwork, and 
co-operation can suffer’ in the top three disadvantages with the scheme.  Comments 
expressed by the managers did not indicate that PRP had created a positive effect 
on teamwork:  ‘Individuals will sacrifice team goals for their own glory’ (Manager, 
1996) was just one of the comments which reflected the views of many.  Others 
commented on a lack of co-operation as a result of the PRP system, and its failure to 
achieve a sense of team spirit.  However, it may be worth considering that the issue 
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of teamwork may be affected by the type of motivation provided by PRP, as one 
manager pointed out: 
 
 It helps to motivate certain individuals with competitive instincts.  It doesn’t 
 motivate people who will do a good job come what may.  It can therefore be 
 divisive on a team with two types of personalities (Manager, 1996). 
 
Appeals System 
Managers were asked for their views on the following statement:  ‘Do you think that 
there is a need for an appeals system?’  Two thirds (65 per cent) replied positively 
while 35 per cent disagreed.  The data indicated a correlation between the need for 
an appeals system and the length of time spent working in the organisation (r = -.32, 
p = .01).   
 
Joint Consultation 
The importance of joint consultation to the perception of equity of PRP schemes is 
discussed in length within the literature.  According to Williams et al. (1993:144), 
‘employees are much more likely to respond to clearly defined mutually agreed 
individual objectives, than they are to grand statements about corporate values, 
however eloquently they are articulated.’ The data indicates that the extent of this 
difficulty within the organisation in question is relatively limited, with less than 20 per 
cent agreeing that they have little voice in the formulation of their work objectives 
and over 82 per cent agreeing that they are allowed a high degree of influence in the 
determination of work objectives.  Table 7 displays positive responses to a number of 
statements concerning the issue of joint consultation in objective setting.   
 
Table 7:  Joint Consultation in Objective Setting 
 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree No View Agree Strongly 
Agree 
I really have little voice in the formulation 
of my work objectives 
 
28 
 
46 
 
6 
 
19 
 
1 
      
I am allowed a high degree of influence in 
the determination of my work objectives. 
 
 
1 
 
 
9 
 
 
8 
 
 
61 
 
 
21 
      
N =70 
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Improvement in Performance 
Though PRP had disadvantages for some managers, there were others who 
supported both its principles and operation.  Individuals indicating a positive 
response to the statement ‘With PRP my individual efforts and achievements are 
recognised’ seemed to be far clearer about their work objectives and how their work 
contributed to the organisation.  They also appeared to be well-informed about the 
company’s plans and performance, and had few difficulties with PRP.  Table 8 shows 
a matrix correlation which indicates the relationship between these matters. 
 
Table 8: Matrix Correlation of Individual Effort and Achievement 
 
With PRP my individual efforts and       Correlation  
achievements are recognised.   
 
My work objectives are clear and specific.  I know exactly what my job is.  .38 
                                                                                                                               p = .001 
I can see how my work contributes to the organisation as a whole.                              .54 
                                                                                                                               p = .000 
I have a clear idea about how the organisation is performing overall.                          .49 
                                                                                                                               p = .000 
I am generally told what is going on in the company.                                                   .60 
                                                                                                                               p = .000 
I’ve got a clear idea of what this organisation’s goals and plans are for the future.     .42 
                                                                                                                               p = .000 
PRP has yet to overcome some difficulties in this organisation                               -  .35 
                                                                                                                               p = .004  
N = 70 
 
In an effort to establish the most effective way of improving on performance, a 
detailed analysis of those who had perceived an improvement in performance was 
carried out, the results of which are shown in table 9.  Three quarters  of 
respondents agreed with the statement ‘PRP has contributed to a general 
improvement in performance.’  This proportion of  managers appeared to have found 
increased communication with their supervisors and a more focused direction in their 
work.  They also seemed to have a clear idea of the company’s goals for the future 
of the organisation, and have found PRP to have affected the extent of initiative 
shown in their work. 
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Table 9: Improving on Performance 
 
PRP has contributed to a general                                                                         Correlation 
improvement in my performance. 
 
Increased communication with boss as a result of PRP                                            .39 
                                                                                                                             p = .002 
PRP makes me show more initiative                                                                         .51 
                                                                                                                             p = .000 
PRP makes me focus on what I’m meant to achieve                                                 .35 
                                                                                                                             p = .003 
I have a clear idea of the company’s goals and plans for the future                          .42 
                                                                                                                            p = .003 
N = 70 
 
Managers who agreed with the statement ‘with PRP my individual achievements are 
recognised’ similarly agreed with the statement ‘PRP gives an incentive to work 
beyond the requirements of the job’ (r = .51, p = .000), indicating the possibility that 
recognition gives incentive to increase performance, lending support to the argument 
that the key to increasing performance may be obtained through, not a monetary 
incentive, but through the recognition element of an incentive. 
 
Organisational Culture 
In the follow-up interviews, it became clear that that there were differences between 
managers working in different subsidiaries in their perceptions and experience of 
PRP.  Certain managers appeared to accept the changes in the reward system 
wrought by PRP, while in others, its presence was largely resented.  The findings  
indicated that managers in younger companies to were more accepting of PRP than  
managers in older companies:  
 
We have seen a change in the culture of the organisation, slowly from a 
static, hierarchical structure to active team based structure (Manager, 1996). 
 
A manager in one of the younger subsidiaries summed up the contrasting attitudes 
to PRP in stating: 
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 It’s different in different parts of the group.  Others in the group it might have 
 been alien to, in a more commercial organisation it was a normal sort of a 
 thing (Manager, 1996). 
 
Cuming (1993:281) argues that ‘it is important to design a reward package which is 
consistent with the goals and culture of an organisation’.  The very nature of PRP 
schemes sends messages to employees about organisational values and goals.  As 
Brown (1995:137) points out, ‘an organisations reward system ...can be thought of a 
as an unequivocal statement of its values, beliefs and assumptions’.  Hence, the 
application of a uniform reward scheme into a range of differing organisations with 
differing histories and cultures has the potential to overlook the individual nature of 
subsidiaries within a multi-division organisation.  Armstrong and Murlis (1991:41) 
suggest that although reward policies should be consistent with corporate culture, 
there is no such thing as a ‘right’ policy.  They further note that ‘reward policies have 
to take into account...the corporate culture and values and the type of organisation in 
which the policies are being applied’. 
 
DISCUSSION 
The research shows that the case company  had implemented a PRP scheme which 
was perceived as contributing to an increase in performance and to increased profits 
for the organisation.  However, in contemplating what exactly constitutes a 
successful scheme, it seems worthwhile to point out the implications of defining a 
scheme’s success.  A lack of substantial literature evidence as a means of 
monitoring a scheme’s success leaves little guidance in finding a point of evaluation.  
With various factors such as profits, employee satisfaction, increased motivation and 
competition at stake, it is difficult to assess which criteria contributes to the success 
of a scheme.  Perhaps the achievement of the scheme’s original objectives could be 
offered as a starting point, however, these are often revised during a scheme’s 
operation.  Therefore, the dilemma of choosing the most appropriate criteria on 
which to judge a scheme’s success remains.   
 
The main conclusion to be drawn is that PRP generally proves ineffective when 
imposed as a singular initiative without prior consideration to environmental factors, 
particularly the organisational culture.  In order for a PRP scheme to operate 
successfully it requires a supporting infrastructure.   As  Brown (1995:139)  has 
pointed out: 
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 No single programme, policy or system is likely to have much impact on one 
organisation.  For the human resource approach to the management of 
culture to have any realistic chance of success an integrated package of 
initiatives will be required. 
 
The long-standing debate of what motivates has by no means been resolved through 
this study.  However, some interesting conclusions can be drawn which reflect what 
some of the literature has already proposed.  With the majority of managers in the 
survey responding favourably to the concept of PRP and three quarters of 
respondents agreeing that PRP had inspired increased performance, it would appear 
that PRP had achieved substantial positive motivational effects.  However, this does 
not necessarily indicate that it was the monetary element which created the 
incentive.  Improved communication with superiors, increased focus on set 
objectives and a clear picture of how individual work fits into overall company goals 
were observed as associate characteristics of motivation.  Indeed, it could be argued 
that all three characteristics could be derived from increased communication and by 
implication, communication is essential for an effective PRP scheme.  Essentially, 
the study indicated that a number of factors may have been responsible for inspiring 
motivation for increased performance, including the symbolic status of a pay 
increase signifying recognition of well accomplished work and the increased and 
more effective channels of communication opened by PRP’s introduction. 
 
The study further indicated that pays ability to motivate was more likely to succeed  
in certain environments.  The ethos of paying for performance appeared to be widely 
accepted in some organisations, whereas in others, it was resented.  Although no 
variables such as length of service, or age of employee were found affecting this 
viewpoint, it was considered that the organisation itself may have a direct impact on 
the acceptability of PRP.  The company culture particular to individual organisations 
is considered to be a significant factor in the determination of PRP’s success.  
Emerging from this, a number of considerations become prevalent.  First, it is 
suggested that the flexible adaptability of the reward scheme in the implementation 
of PRP in various subsidiaries is considered most appropriate.  Second, the 
evidence suggests that it is highly important to take into consideration an 
organisation’s history and culture in designing and implementing a reward package 
so that the two are consistent with each other.   
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